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Abstract 
1
  
The paper analyzes the relationship, whether complementary or substitutive, between 
inward FDI and gross domestic investment in the six GCC countries using cointegration 
techniques and fully modified GMM estimation. Based on panel data, the empirical 
evidence implies that in Qatar, Oman, UAE and Saudi Arabia, the inward FDI has positive 
long-run and short-run effects on the domestic investment. For Bahrain, such a 
complementary relationship exists only in the short-run. For the majority of GCC 
countries, the long-run elasticities have large magnitude compared to the short-run 
counterparts, justifying more attraction of the FDI in the temporal horizon. 
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1. Introduction  
Considering that the investment is a fundamental engine of economic growth, we 
propose that openness to foreign direct investment (FDI) may stimulate public and 
private investment in the long run. This paper analyzes the interaction between FDI 
and gross domestic investment (GDI) in the short and long run to evaluate whether the 
effect is complementary or substitutive. Inward FDI (IFDI) makes a direct contribution 
to economic growth and impacts other macroeconomic variables such GDI 
(Borensztein et al. 1998). In addition, IFDI could potentially improve the efficiency of 
local natural and human resources, mainly when the host economy is characterized by 
consistent real economic growth and an optimal market size (Damiano 2010). The 
foreign firms could have access to domestic financial funds with better cost 
conditions, which would increase their financial returns relative to external financial 
markets. The lower costs of capital and labor in host economies could motivate the 
foreign firms to locate intermediate or final production abroad for local or foreign 
customers (Lipsey 2006). This argument could increase the competitiveness between 
local and foreign investors, which leads to crowding-out or crowding-in effects (Desai 
et al. 2005, Stevens and Lipsey 1992). Theoretically, the total effect of IFDI on 
domestic investment seems to be undetermined and requires an empirical investigation 
(Kim et al. 2003, 2013). The foreign investor could be attracted by the prevalence of 
natural resources of the host country. Generally in such cases, the increase in exports 
leads to more earnings for the foreign investor (Blomstrom & Kokko 2003, Lipsey 
2006). Since the last decade, the economic and financial reforms in most Gulf 
Cooperation Council countries (GCC) have attracted more inward foreign capital, and 
from 2004, the FDI ‘engine’ has worked especially well in Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the 
United Arab Emirates (UAE) (UNCTAD, WIR 2011).  
The economies of GCC, as one of the richest regional groupings in the world, are 
characterized by a ‘saving glut effect’ (Ghassan et al. 2011, Bracke et al. 2008), but 
they attract IFDI as the main channel of technology diffusion (Globerman et al. 2002). 
For the foreign capital owner, FDI implies direct control of assets used in the 
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production process; FDI could increase or decrease their competitiveness vis-à-vis 
other enterprises in the world. For the host economy, the FDI process involves the 
transfer of resources other than capital such as technology, management, 
organizational and marketing skills (Helpman 2006). The relationship between FDI 
and GDI should influence the economic and financial processes in both the host and 
home countries.  
Many empirical papers focused at the macro level find a negative relationship 
between IFDI and GDI for OECD countries (Feldstein 1994), Germany (Herzer & 
Schrooten 2008) and Finland (Sauramo 2008); in contrast, for the USA, the 
relationship seems to be positive (Desai et al. 2005). The study of Sadik & Bolbol 
(2001) examines the IFDI-total factor productivity relationship using aggregate cross-
Arabic country data; the main result is that IFDI has dominant crowding-out effects on 
GDI. There are a large number of papers analyzing the nexus between FDI and 
economic growth, but few articles explore the dynamic relationship between FDI and 
GDI as two flows of investments. This paper contributes to (i) the little literature of 
development economics and economic policy literature related to relation between 
inward FDI and domestic investment in GCC countries by examining the impact of 
IFDI on GDI in the short and long run using cointegration and causality analyses. 
From such econometric framework, we determine (ii) some specificities of each 
economy in GCC countries in terms of short and long run elasticities, which explain 
the success extent of the government FDI policy. The domestic productive capacity 
may strictly limit the non-inflationary level of FDI and domestic investment producing 
mainly non-tradable goods. The next Section 2 introduces the theoretical background 
of the potential impact of the inward FDI on the GDI and summarizes the findings of 
the related empirical literature and exhibits the data and discusses the inward FDI 
development in the GCC region. Section 3 shows the empirical issues, estimation 
methodology and the empirical results. Section 4 provides discussion on the main 
results and Section 5 provides the conclusion and policy implications. 
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2. Basic equation and data  
The first- and the second-order conditions, corresponding to profit-maximizing levels 
of domestic investment and to the interactive effects between domestic and foreign 
investments, respectively, are as follows:   
           
  
                                       
            
     
      
where   is the output function and   is the marginal cost-capital function,   is 
domestic capital,    is foreign capital, and   is a vector of variables relevant to output. 
In this setting, a change in    and   affects domestic economic activity by influencing 
 . Supposing        and non-fixed financial resources, the implicit relationship 
between home and foreign capital can be related through the production process and 
extracted from derived demand function. The implicit first-order condition may take 
any form, depending on market conditions and government policies. However, the 
main idea here addresses the final impact, which could reveal substitution or 
complementarities between domestic capital and foreign capital. When      is 
negative, there is a crowding-out or at least a substitution effect between foreign and 
domestic investment. In contrast, when      is positive, the presence of foreign 
capital motivates a high level of domestic activity. Nevertheless, the investment 
opportunities abroad leads initially to substitutability, but over time the increase in 
aggregate demand could lead to enhanced domestic investment mainly in non-tradable 
sector. Furthermore, financial liberalization allows the local foreign firms to borrow 
from domestic sources; this pattern of loans could amplify the effects of foreign 
investment on domestic investment.  
The challenge here is to model the individual dynamic interactions between 
domestic capital   and foreign capital    in terms of investment intensity, taking into 
account the fact that FDI would be weakly exogenous, by estimating the following 
investment equation: 
                               
   
   
             
   
 
   
                                   (1) 
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where   and    are domestic and foreign investment, respectively, and   stands for 
gross domestic product. Empirically, the time series properties of these variables play 
a key role.   is a time trend that reflects the technological effect on the investment 
process and   denotes the usual error term.2 The individual index   corresponds to a 
specific country; our panel is composed of six GCC countries: (in alphabetical order) 
Bahrain (BAH), Kuwait (KUW), Oman (OMN), Qatar (QTR), Saudi Arabia (SAR) 
and the UAE. The GCC countries are quite heterogeneous; therefore, to avoid any 
endogeneity bias in the statistical results, we separately analyze each country. Gross 
capital formation is used as a measure of gross domestic investment, and the data on 
    are drawn from the database of World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
(2011).
3
 Data on inward FDI are from the UNCTAD FDI/TNC database 
(www.unctad.org/fdistatistics).
4
  
We can summarize the data set by examining the descriptive statistics using a 
box-plot as simple visual method identifying patterns that may otherwise be hidden in 
a data set.
5
 The box-plot clearly highlights important landmarks of the data and the 
star point inside the box is the mean. Examination of the Fig. 1 readily suggests few 
conclusions. The inner fences in the box of ratio IFDI to GDP are small than ratio GDI 
to GDP. It appears clearly that the ratio IFDI-GDP does not exceed in average 10% for 
all GCC region. It is immediately evident that during the last three decades, while the 
investment rates in GCC (21.2%) have always been comparable in average to those of 
                                              
2
 The variable I/Y could be stationary around the mean level     or trend-stationary around 
  with spillover effects from FDI/GDP. The investment-GDP ratio could be non-stationary, 
in which case FDI/GDP would be irrelevant and the relationship could be examined using 
more appropriate tests and estimation methods.  
3
 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG/countries/latest?display=default. 
4
 All data are presented in millions of U.S. dollars and transformed into logarithms. For all 
GCC, the annual sample period is 1979-2010. The plots of     (GDI intensity) and      
(Inward FDI intensity) exhibit many particularities. 
5 The box-plot summarizes the distribution of our data set by displaying the centering and 
spread of the data. The points outside the inner fence (shaded part of Fig. 1, Appendices) 
are known as outliers. 
6 
 
the largest industrial economies G7 (21.3%), IFDI have been consistently much lower, 
in fact during the period 2009-2010 almost 10% comparatively to G7.
6
   
The Kuwait’s average ratio IFDI-GDP is quasi-null and its GDI-GDP ratio is the 
less one among the GCC economies. The average of GDI to GDP in Qatar is the 
greatest in GCC region, but the average ratio IFDI-GDP of Qatar is similar to Oman, 
Saudi Arabia and UAE. The IFDI and GDI box-plots have quasi-similar size for Saudi 
Arabia and Bahrain. In addition, Qatar’s GDI-GDP ratios exhibit that the distribution 
is positively skewed indicating that Qatar economy could potentially exceed 40% as a 
percent of GDI to GDP. Also, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Oman show positively skewed 
distribution for IFDI ratio, whereas UAE indicates negative skewed distribution. 
Overall, SAR, QTR, OMN and UAE are a quasi-similar mean of IFDI-GDP, while 
Bahrain has a greater mean.  
The share of IFDI has more variability across GCC countries; despite of 
increasing share of GDI to GDP, we expect that there are many disparities between 
economies in GCC countries conducting to specific behavior of IFDI across GCC 
region. We can directly conclude from Fig. 1 that the rates of GDI to GDP are at least 
double of the rates of IFDI to GDP, indicating a large potential IFDI in GCC region. 
We have to find out evidences for such deduction by modeling the relationships 
between IFDI and GDI in the short and long run.   
Since the GCC countries have typically large current account surpluses, the 
relationship between GDI and IFDI depends on domestic capacity to attract abroad 
investors. The large accumulation of current account surplus during the recent episode 
of volatile rising oil prices (from US$ 145 to 40 and to 120 per barrel) has qualified 
the GCC region to emerge as a major net supplier of capital on a global scale, second 
only to East Asian countries (Strum et al. 2008). But, the perturbation in oil prices and 
export levels influences the current account, the official reserve assets (Mehrara & 
Oskoui 2007) and has a significant bearing on investment choices. During the last 
                                              
6 Author’s calculation from UNCTAD (WIR, 2011): www.bea.gov/international. 
http://www.economywatch.com/economic-statistics/Major-advanced-economies-(G7).    
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decade, the GCC economies records continuous excess in payment balance and then 
official reserves. Since 2000, the GCC countries have engaged important development 
plans upgrading the region’s infrastructure, favoring internal economic activities and 
attracting foreign investors through profitable investment opportunities. After the US 
invasion in Iraq, political developments in Iran and increased instability in neighboring 
countries, the GCC region has strived to deepen ties with EU member states on 
economic, security and defense matters. The GCC has become the EU’s 6
th
 largest 
export market and trade flows have proved resilient to the worldwide economic and 
financial crisis.
7
 Patterns of trade revolve around exports of machinery, electrical 
products, manufactured goods and chemicals from the EU (Antikiewicz et al. 2009). 
EU-GCC investments are even more important in magnitude, but still be small player 
in GCC economies in comparison to the USA top partner in IFDI. 
 
3. Results  
3.1. Testing for the existence of a level relationship  
To test the existence of a long-run relationship between IFDI and GDI, we use the 
autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) approach (Pesaran et al. 2001), which does not 
require pre-testing for unit roots prior to the cointegration test. Then, the error 
correction form of the ARDL model for Eq. (1) is as follows: 
   
 
 
 
  
              
 
 
 
    
     
  
 
 
    
     
 
     
 
 
 
    
     
 
     
  
 
 
    
       (2) 
Consequently, the existence of a long-run relationship among specified variables is 
tested by calculating the F-statistic for the null hypothesis of no cointegration. The 
conditional ARDL model in Eq. (2) involves selecting the optimal orders of   and  ; 
we started by selecting the order of the VAR using many lag criteria such AIC, SIC 
and BIC. With the annual data, the maximum number of lags for parsimony is less 
                                              
7 European Commission, Directorate General for Trade (DG TRADE), “EU Bilateral 
Trade with the GCC and Trade with the World”, September 2010 and March 2012. 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113482.pdf.  
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than or equal to 3. The bound cointegration test is performed through a standard F-test 
for the joint significance of the lagged levels of the variables:                   
against                  . When a long-run relationship exists between the 
variables in Eq. (2), the F-test indicates which variable should be normalized. The 
normalization gives the statistic         where   is the dependent variable. As 
discussed by Pesaran et al. (2001), the F-test has a non-standard distribution; they 
provide two asymptotic critical value bounds.
8
  
To determine whether a trend   should be included in the specification, Eq. (2) is 
estimated with and without a trend using least squares and the generalized method of 
moments. It turns out that a trend is needed only for the case of United Arab Emirates. 
For Kuwait, one impulse dummy     is required to transform the residuals to be 
normally distributed. The dummy variable     controls for the invasion of Kuwait 
known as the Iraq-Kuwait war, which was closely related to the crude oil production 
quota of OPEC members. The bound critical values are not valid with an impulse 
dummy in Eq. (2);  however, these critical values will be valid when we consider 
dummy D91 as an outlier point using the program TRAMO (Gómez & Maravall 2001) 
allowing us to obtain the corrected series of GDI/GDP for Kuwait. The standard lag 
selection criteria from the underlying VAR model for the conditional ECM i.e., Eq. (2) 
and the related Lagrange Multiplier (LM) statistics for residual serial correlation 
suggest that the optimal lags lie between 1 and 4.
9
 For Bahrain, Oman and Saudi 
Arabia, equation (2) is estimated by fully modified GMM (Kitamura and Phillips 
1997) to determine the statistical significance of the relevant parameters. The 
                                              
8
 The lower value of the F-statistic assumes that the variable is I(0) and the upper value 
supposes that the variable is I(1). If the calculated F-statistic lies above the upper bound 
critical value, then the null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected. This null hypothesis 
is accepted if the F-statistic falls below the lower critical value.  
9
 Because the serially uncorrelated errors assumption is so important for the validity of the 
bounds tests, we apply the general-to-specific model reduction procedure by successively 
eliminating the least significant variables of the ARDL model. This process leads us to 
select     for Bahrain and Oman and     for Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and United 
Arab Emirates. 
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calculated  -statistics and some residual diagnostics are reported in Table 1.1 and 
Table 1.2 (Appendix), respectively.
10
 Because the  -statistics are larger than the upper 
bound critical values, the null of no cointegration (H0) can be rejected at the 1% 
significance level for Saudi Arabia and the UAE and at the 5% significance level for 
the other GCC countries.    
All the p-values exceed the conventional significance levels. Table 1.2 
(Appendix) shows that the residuals do not display any signs of autocorrelation, 
conditional heteroskedasticity or non-normality. Furthermore, for Kuwait, Qatar and 
UAE, the CUSUM of squares tests indicate that the equations estimated by least 
squares are stable. For the other countries (Bahrain, Oman and Saudi Arabia), Eq. (2) 
is estimated by fully modified GMM (Kitamura and Phillips 1997); this estimation 
procedure requires an appropriate test of stability. Following Andrews (1993) and 
using the GMM estimators, the data may be stationary or non-stationary under the null 
hypothesis of parameter stability. The stability test can perform well in cointegrated 
models that include at least many extra lags of each variable with correct lag order 
without affecting the distributional result under the null hypothesis (Dolado & 
Lutkepohl 1996). To test the stability, we use statistics from the W-test and the O-
test.
11
 Under the null hypothesis, the over-identifying restrictions are valid before and 
after the break point (Hall and Sen 1999). Due to the sample size, the break point year 
(1997) is chosen by partitioning the sample in two equal subsamples. The results of 
the composite null hypothesis based on the W- and O-tests unanimously indicate that 
the parameters are not a source of instability and that the over-identifying restrictions 
                                              
10
 For Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, the ARDL model 
corresponds to a specification with an unrestricted intercept and no trend: the relevant 
critical value bounds are from Table C1.iii. For Qatar, the ARDL model corresponds to a 
specification with an unrestricted intercept and an unrestricted trend: the relevant critical 
value bounds are from Table C1.v.   
11
 The null hypothesis of the O-test has an advantage in two situations that arise in 
empirical work. The first situation is that only the parameter values have changed, but all 
other features of the model have remained the same (Hall & Sen 1999). The second 
situation is that instability causes a more fundamental misspecification, which can be 
reflected in a violation of the null hypothesis. 
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are valid in both subsamples. Thus, statistically valid inference can be drawn for a 
level relationship between      
 
 and       
 
.     
    Table 1.1 Bound cointegration test 
 
Note: † and ٭ denote the 1% and 5% level of significance, respectively. The critical value 
bounds for I(0) and I(1) are from Pesaran et al. (2001). Critical values from Table C1.iii 
with an unrestricted intercept and no trend: (6.84; 7.84) at 1% and (4.94; 5.73) at 5%. 
Critical values in Table C1.v with an unrestricted intercept and an unrestricted trend: (8.74; 
9.63) at 1% and (6.56; 7.30) at 5%.  
       Table 1.3 Stability tests: Andrews & Fair (1988), Hall & Sen (1999) 
Country BAH OMN SAR 
W-statistic 65.934 [0.00] 59.245 [0.00] 13.948 [0.03] 
O-statistic 5.772 [0.22] 5.489 [0.24] 1.761 [0.41] 
       Note: Numbers in brackets are the p-values.   
 
When cointegration is confirmed to involve stationarity of the estimated error   , we 
can use the Stock (1987) approach after the estimation of Eq. (2) and check for 
robustness using the Phillips and Loretan (1991) procedure (Herzer & Schrooten 
2008). Nevertheless, other single equation methods such as fully modified OLS 
(FMOLS) by Phillips and Hansen (1990), canonical cointegration regression (CCR) by 
Park (1992) and dynamic OLS (DOLS) by Saikkonen, Stock and Watson (1992) could 
serve to check for robustness of the results by estimating the long-run elasticity     
directly from the ARDL equation.
12
 The equation of Phillips-Loretan (1991) is 
determined as follows:  
                                              
12
 In our empirical work, the DOLS equation is more comparable to the Phillips-Loretan 
equation than to FMOLS or CCR, which do not involve an augmented cointegrating 
regression. 
Country H0 F-stat. 
BAH         6.436* 
OMN         6.738* 
SAR         9.144† 
QTR            8.444* 
KWT         7.425* 
UAE         9.804† 
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  (3) 
where                       
 
 
   
 
   
 ,     represents the conditional long-run multiplier 
and     is an impulse dummy. The Phillips-Loretan equation is estimated with up to 
three lags and leads      . The impulse dummies are introduced to achieve 
normally distributed residuals. From the lagged error-correction term        
    
     
     
        
 
    derived from the second term of Eq. (3), the final stage 
obtains the short-run dynamic coefficients from the ECM in Eq. (4):  
  
 
 
 
  
       
 
     
 
 
 
    
     
 
     
  
 
 
    
      
 
   
              
 
 
  
      (4) 
where           are the short-run dynamic coefficients and   is the speed of 
adjustment to the long-run equilibrium.  
3.2. Estimation of the long-run relationship 
Having found that      
 
 and       
 
 are cointegrated, the next stage is to estimate 
the long-run parameters. We make use of the simple Stock (1987) approach and obtain 
the long-run coefficients from Eq. (2) by dividing the estimated coefficients on 
      
 
 by the absolute values of the estimated coefficients on       
 
:              . 
Table 2 displays the results.  
 
   Table 2 Long-run relationship: Stock (1987) procedure    
 BAH KUW OMN QTR SAR UAE 
    
-0.386 
(-3.57) 
-0.621 
(-3.74) 
-0.693 
(-3.67) 
-1.412 
(-4.97) 
-0.219 
(-2.26) 
-0.683 
(-3.88) 
    
-0.217 
(-1.75) 
-5.196 
(-1.81) 
0.972 
(3.36) 
6.210 
(4.55) 
0.272 
(4.09) 
0.934 
(4.02) 
             -0.562 -8.367 1.402 4.398 1.242 1.367 
   Note: Numbers in parentheses are the t-statistics.   
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For Qatar, the UAE, Oman and Saudi Arabia, the coefficients on       
 
 are 
positive; for Bahrain and Kuwait, these coefficients are negative. For Qatar, the 
coefficient is 4.398, which implies that a one-dollar increase in inward investment 
leads to a more than four-dollar increase in domestic investment. Accordingly, in 
Qatar, the investment effects are substantial and indicate the presence of positive 
spillovers from IFDI to the domestic economy. For Oman, Saudi Arabia and United 
Arab Emirates, these positive spillovers are tiny: a one-dollar increase in FDI leads to 
less than a two-dollar increase in domestic investment, as discussed in AlObaidan 
(2002). Additionally, Roberts and Almahmood (2009) conclude that exporters to Saudi 
Arabia do not invest there. However, for Kuwait, the coefficient on       
 
 is -8.367; 
this value implies that domestic investment decreases by 8.36 dollars with a one-dollar 
increase in inward FDI. This result is not surprising: according to IMF and UNCTAD 
data reports, GCC countries, with the exception of Kuwait, are net importers of FDI.
13
 
In addition, for Kuwait, inward FDI constitutes a minor share of GDI; therefore, IFDI 
might simply be too marginal to have a serious growth impact. For Bahrain, a one-
dollar increase in inward investment leads to a greater-than-half-dollar decrease in 
domestic investment. Possible factors behind this result are the gap in the privatization 
process of public enterprises in Bahrain compared to other GCC countries and the 
limited oil supplies of Bahrain.  
 
3.3. Test of Robustness 
To ensure the robustness of our findings, the Phillips-Loretan equation is used for all 
panels. Nevertheless, for Bahrain, Oman and Saudi Arabia, the long-run coefficients 
are robust for cointegrated variables because they are obtained from fully modified 
GMM. 
                                              
13
 The GCC countries still account for more than 60% of all foreign investment flows to 
the Arab world (UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2011, Table A in the Appendices). 
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Table 3.1 Phillips-Loretan (1991) procedure: nonlinear LS    
      
                   
KUW  -8.633 (-2.37) 0.83 2.00 [0.17] 0.94 [0.40] 1.05 [0.59] 
QTR 4.428 (8.93) 0.97 0.88 [0.78] 0.31 [0.74] 0.12 [0.94] 
UAE 1.403 (4.07) 0.84 0.12 [0.89] 1.04 [0.37] 0.56 [0.75] 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are the t-statistics, and p-values are in brackets.   
 
After applying the general-to-specific modeling approach to equation (3), the 
estimated coefficients on       
 
 in Tables 3 are roughly equal to the corresponding 
    values in Table 2. Indeed, our results for Kuwait, Qatar and United Arab Emirates 
are robust to different estimation procedures. For other countries, we use also the 
Phillips-Loretan (1991) procedure to obtain the corresponding error correction terms 
that will be introduced in the dynamic ECM equation (4). Overall, the results from the 
Phillips-Loretan procedure suggest that our results are robust to different estimation 
methods, including the DOLS procedure (Appendix, Table 3.3).  
  Table 3.2 Phillips-Loretan (1991) procedure    
      
                   
BAH -0.564 (-2.68) 0.79 0.13 [0.88] 0.32 [0.73] 0.76 [0.69] 
OMN 1.430 (1.84) 0.83 0.44 [0.65] 0.11 [0.74] 3.09 [0.21] 
SAR 1.158 (2.78) 0.89 0.17 [0.69] 0.21 [0.65] 0.64 [0.73] 
   Note: Numbers in parentheses are the t-statistics, and p-values are in brackets. 
   
3.4. Test of causality 
In testing for Granger (1988) causality, we introduce the residuals from the long-run 
relationships in Tables 3; these estimates correspond to the second term of the right-
hand side of Eq. (3). The appropriate residuals are included as error correction terms in 
Eq. (4); we allow for up to three lags. For each of the GCC countries, we have the 
following error correction terms: 
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Table 4 reports the results of the ECM from Eq. (4) after applying the general-to-
specific model reduction procedure. To make easy the comparison between GCC 
countries, we summarize the estimated GDI-to-FDI elasticities in the Fig. 2.        
 
Fig. 2 Long and short-run elasticities of GDI to FDI in GCC countries 
             Note: Mean_2 is for all countries. Mean_1 is calculated without Kuwait.  
 
On average without the exceptional case of Kuwait, the long run elasticities have 
large magnitude compared to their short run counterparts. We expect that even if the 
short run elasticity is negative, the long run elasticity has a large positive effect on 
domestic investment. Hence, for the majority of GCC countries these results justify to 
attract the foreign direct investment. Oman and Saudi Arabia exhibit positive 
elasticities in short and long run. These results could be explained by the facts that 
Oman and Saudi Arabia are more open to private foreign GCC and non-GCC investors 
in financial and real sectors. In the other side, Qatar and UAE have less concentrated 
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banking sector than the other GCC countries, but this sector still open only for foreign 
GCC banks.  
Saudi Arabia, UAE and Qatar attract the high level of IFDI in GCC region (Table 
A) by accumulating more than US$ 44 billion during 2009. The foreign investment 
flows lead to buy new imported machinery and increase output in many sectors. These 
mechanisms could explain the high level of the long run elasticities in Qatar, Oman, 
UAE and Saudi Arabia, respectively (Fig. 2). These empirical findings are compatible 
with the UNCTAD report about investment perspectives in GCC countries (UNCTAD 
2011). Furthermore, the economic policies of governments in Qatar, UAE and Saudi 
Arabia plan to reduce economic dependence on the oil and gas sectors by accelerating 
growth and diversifying the economy through non-oil and non-gas foreign 
investments. The investment in construction and commerce sectors, in addition to 
Greenfield investment, constitute business opportunities in the long run. While most of 
our results validate the findings of previous research (as Sadik & Bolbol 2001, Desai 
& Foley & Hines 2005, Herzer & Shrooten 2008, Roberts & Almahmood 2009), the 
comparison of the impact of IFDI reveals disparate results across GCC-countries. This 
disparity requires more investigation and could be explained by several factors such 
the gap in privatization process, the nature and size of foreign investments, the degree 
of financial sophistication, the openness to foreign non-GCC banks, the level of 
development of the economy, the shocks that each country encounters, and the policies 
adopted by different governments.  
The lagged error correction terms have the expected negative sign and are 
statistically significant, which implies the existence of a relationship between IFDI and 
domestic investment for each of the GCC countries. The long-run Granger causality 
indicates that the IFDI has a long-run effect on GDI; it also indicates that the speed of 
adjustment is very fast for the UAE, Kuwait and Qatar. However, the speed of 
adjustment from any disequilibrium towards the long-run equilibrium is more gradual 
for SAR, Bahrain and Oman. For all GCC countries, the short-run effects are 
statistically significant except for Kuwait, and the sign is either positive or negative as 
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indicated in Table 4. The same signs are also already established from Eq. (2). 
Therefore, for Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Oman, IFDI has a positive short-run effect, 
but a negative long-run effect on domestic investment. Meanwhile, for the UAE and 
Qatar, IFDI has negative short- and long-run effects. Saudi Arabia exhibits opposite 
effects compared with Qatar and the UAE: the short-run effect on Saudi domestic 
investment is negative, while the analogous effect in Qatar and the UAE is positive. 
Additionally, for Saudi Arabia, the short-run impact of inward FDI has a positive sign; 
however, the short-run impact is negative for the UAE and Qatar. The results of a 
Wald test indicate that the lagged first difference of IFDI intensity for Bahrain, Saudi 
Arabia and the UAE jointly affects the first difference of the GDI intensity. These 
results reveal a short-run crowding-in effect for Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, but a short-
run crowding-out impact for the UAE.  
 
4. Discussion 
We shall argue that the differences in elasticities are likely to reflect the variations in 
resource endowment and attractiveness capacity of FDI across the GCC countries. We 
can briefly discuss some non-standard features of investment in oil-exporting 
developing economies. Part of the difficulty stems from the fact that the government 
holds exclusively the ownership and extraction rights to hydrocarbon resources. The 
oil-export revenues affect directly the balance of payments and accrue directly to the 
national treasuries. The saving must in turn be allocated to either domestic capital 
formation or accumulation of foreign assets (Ghassan et al. 2011). The domestic 
capital formation has the advantages to develop the capacity of oil export, and to 
diversify the domestic production and export, and thereby reducing the dependence on 
the oil and gas sectors. Generally, the level of domestic investment depends on 
complementary resources, supply of skilled labor and domestic market size. The IFDI 
can reduce such constraints when foreign investors target both domestic and 
international markets leading to induce more domestic investment. However, it 
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remains that too high level of GDI may result in an increase in prices of non-tradable 
goods, due probably to the low level of competitiveness. 
A further feature of the Gulf countries is that the private domestic investment is 
low relative to public investment. The government should break down the vicious 
loan-credit cycle and expand the joint domestic private local and foreign investment 
projects. The investors seek high return opportunities, whereas developing countries 
look for technologies and large share of world markets. In 1990s, the private to public 
investment ratio was less than 2:1, whereas for the OECD countries it was over 6:1 
(Sala-i-Martin & Artadi 2002). The low level of private investment can be explained 
by the low decoupling level of the non-oil sector from the oil sector –resulting in an 
apparent rareness of investment opportunities. The IFDI seeks to capture new 
opportunities mainly when the financial markets of the host economy are more 
developed and competitive, reducing then the monopole of banks. The financial 
liberalization, between markets across the world, contributes to increase the financial 
flows, extending direct and financial investments (Bracke & Fidora 2008). The 
dominance of public ownership in many companies caused low levels of financial 
development in the GCC region (Sala-i-Martin & Artadi 2002). Bohnet et al. (2010) 
find that in Kuwait, Oman and UAE, a high minimum trustworthiness threshold is 
required compared to the USA and Switzerland. Another feature of the financial 
markets is that bank investments in securities are higher in public than private sector.
14
 
The situation is largely exacerbated during economic downturn caused by the 
unexpected decrease of oil prices leading to public sector’s borrowing from the 
banking system. The IFDI can promote domestic capital formation in GCC region, 
when the direct investments are more diversified and heavily re-directed towards 
construction, real-estate, high education, financial intermediation, insurance, ICT, 
                                              
14
 In Saudi Arabia, the private share in bank securities during 2008 is 1.2% and 12.0% for 
the public sector. In contrast, bank credits are higher in private sector with 40.6% than the 
public sector with 1.8% only (author’s calculation source: SAMA Annual Economic 
Reports and Bulletin 44, 2009). 
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water, solar energy and other sectors in addition to traditional oil and gas and 
wholesale and retail trade sectors. It will also increase the export of the total non-oil-
export reaching for example in Saudi Arabia 73% in 2006 and 58% in 2009 (Source: 
SAGIA Annual Report of FDI, 2010). We expect that the IFDI in real-estate is more 
speculative and hence has limited positive spillover effect participating little to 
economic progress in comparison to the IFDI in construction. This latter may 
contribute to diversify the productive base of the GCC economies and could upgrade 
labor skills.  
To sum up the previous discussion, two main elements describe a picture of the 
investment processes in GCC region: (i) the GDI is crucially affected by the public 
investment, which in turn is affected by foreign investors both leading to improve the 
productive capacity of the GCC economies; (ii) the domestic productive capacity may 
strictly limit the non-inflationary level of domestic investment producing non-tradable 
goods, but the foreign investment may be not constrained by domestic capacity when 
the output can also be oriented to the international markets. These elements suggest 
the existence of linkage between GDI and IFDI, where the causality runs from IFDI to 
GDI and the investments are limited by the available saving resources and the non-
inflationary level of domestic public and private investments (Basher & Fachin 2013).  
The big residual public savings are used for the accumulation of foreign assets 
serving the dual purpose of stabilization and precautionary saving (World Bank, 
2006). For instance, since 2006 the ratio of international liquidity to GDP in Saudi 
Arabia becomes greater than 100% (Ghassan et al. 2011). Following Nowak, 
Andritzky, Jobst & Tamirisa (2009), we expect that the international liquidity shocks 
could occur from domestic (good or bad) news when the fiscal policy decide to 
increase the investment to GDP ratio or when the domestic stock markets become less 
(more) volatile requiring less (more) domestic liquidity. Furthermore, the international 
liquidity shocks could happen from external financial markets as during the last 
international financial crisis or during high increase in the external asset prices. Since 
the short and long-run effects of the financial markets shocks on economic growth do 
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not exhibit negative signs, and then there is no crowding-out between domestic 
investment and investment in foreign assets. But, it remains that the long-run shifting 
from saving glut effect to absorption effect would increase the investment-to-GDP 
ratio, which is in average, during the two last decades, less than 20% (Kenc & 
Dibooglu 2010).  
Considering the factor related to the domestic productive capacity, we observe in 
particular, for Kuwait that his absorptive capacity is extremely limited in industrial 
and agricultural sectors in comparison to the other GCC economies. Kuwait’s rate of 
domestic investment is the lowest among GCC members (Fig. 2), possibly because of 
the low level of the government investment in infrastructure. The limited domestic 
productive capacity has persuaded Kuwait government to invest a large share of its oil 
revenue in foreign assets. The income from these assets helped Kuwait to deal with 
financial and political crises happening in 1982 and 1990. In contrast, the high 
investment rates in Qatar, followed by UAE and Saudi Arabia, can be explained by 
their efforts to diversify the economic activities, which lead to expand the non-oil 
production capacities to the gas production and the non-hydrocarbon production. This 
expansion in the gas sector has made Qatar the world’s leading exporter of Liquefied 
Natural Gas (LNG). The export of LNG is driven by the long-run contracts, helping 
Qatar’s economy to be decoupled partially from volatility of oil prices (Pindyck 2004). 
In particular, the development in Qatar is behind the high significant positive 
correlation 0.889 (with the P-value equals to 9.7E-12) between IFDI and GDI in 
comparison with other GCC members.
15
  
The UAE is considered among the GCC the least dependent on oil. In addition, 
the State of Dubai, the second largest Emirates in the UAE, has emerged as the leading 
financial center in the Middle East region. Since Bahrain and Oman are relatively 
smaller in oil resources, they were under severe pressure to generate and diversify 
                                              
15
 This correlation is also positive and significant for Oman and Saudi Arabia with 0.458 
(P-value=0.008) and 0.442 (P-value=0.011), respectively; whereas, for United Arab 
Emirates, Kuwait and Bahrain, this correlation is not significant. 
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economic activities. Looney (2009) shows a detailed comparative analysis of 
development in Bahrain and Oman. The Saudi Arabia is the largest GCC country with 
the highest IFDI. Since 1990, the private sector is encouraged to take part of the 
investment opportunities. The burden of defense and security budget constitutes on 
average half of the total government expenditures (Author’s calculation based on 
SAMA Annual Report 48, 2012), but the ratio of investment to GDP still be in average 
around 20% and then lower than the East Asian economies.
16
 However, if the 
crowding-out effect is verified in the Saudi Arabia economy, it does not signify the 
unavailability of capital. The international market affects the domestic banking 
markets by attracting the Saudi liquidity and reduces the loanable funds available for 
local investors (Claessens et al. 2001). The Saudi Arabia investment effort appears to 
be lower owing the slight declining of public investment and stagnating private 
investment rates. Furthermore, compared to other GCC economies the Saudi Arabia is 
more integrated in terms of international liquidity invested in USA and slightly in 
Europe and Asia, but the domestic financial markets still less integrated to the world 
financial markets compared to other GCC members, which is due to the low foreign 
participation in the domestic financial sector.
17
    
 
5. Conclusion  
The empirical evidence implies that in the Qatar, Oman, the UAE and Saudi Arabia, 
inward FDI has positive long-run effects on domestic investment. This complementary 
relationship means that multinational corporations stimulate domestic investment by 
combining their production in the host economy with home nation production. 
However, for Bahrain, such a complementary relationship exists only in the short-run: 
in the long run, IFDI is a weak substitute for domestic investment. For Kuwait, the 
substitution is considerable, indicating a long-run loss of IFDI attractiveness due to the 
                                              
16
 The mean of the investment rate of South Korea, Singapore and Thailand is around 32% 
during 1980-2006. For more details see Kim & Jeon (2013).  
17
 For more details and discussion see Al-Hassan et al. (2010).  
21 
 
flight of domestic capital abroad. For Qatar and the UAE, in the short-run, a decrease 
in IFDI might increase domestic investment. The contribution of FDI to domestic 
investment is generally positive for the majority of GCC countries. Even if Kuwait is a 
net exporter of FDI, it does not reach the optimal resource allocation. By looking 
abroad for profitable foreign opportunities, Kuwait needs more strategic policies to 
reallocate scarce funds by increasing domestic investment and attracting FDI, as is 
done in other GCC countries. Furthermore, any policy makers encouraging FDI should 
prioritize the improvement of domestic investment by increasing the competitiveness 
of the economy in international markets. Such a focus allows for more exports and 
boosts the efficiency gains from technology spillovers in domestic firms and foreign 
affiliates.  
Firm- and industry-level data may be particularly useful for differentiating among 
FDI oriented toward oil exports, non-oil exports and the domestic market. 
Additionally, the effects of FDI in high-value-added manufacturing activities might 
differ from those in extractive sectors. Such sectorial analyses may provide valuable 
insights into the interactions between FDI and GDI. 
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Appendices  
 
 
Fig. 1 Ratio of GDI and FDI to GDP for all GCC countries 
 
 
 
  Table A. Global data of the GCC countries 
 BAH OMN SAR KUW QTR UAE 
SCR 
a Stable 
A 
Stable 
A 
Stable 
AA- 
Stable 
AA- 
Stable 
AA- 
Stable 
AA- 
  CA to GDP 2009 
b 
CA to GDP 2010 
2.9 
4.9 
-1.3 
8.8 
5.6 
14.9 
23.6 
27.8 
10.2 
25.3 
3.0 
7.0 
  IFDI 2009 
c 
IFDI 2010 
257 
156 
1508 
2333 
32100 
28105 
1114 
319 
8125 
4670 
4003 
5500 
  Notes: 
a
 represents the Sovereign Credit Rating (SCR) determined by Capital 
Intelligence Agency for Mid-December 2010. 
b
 stands for the share of Current 
Account (CA) to GDP in percent (Source: IMF.stat). 
c
 corresponds to Inward FDI 
(IFDI) in US$ millions (Source: UNCTAD, WIR, 2011).      
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Table 1.2 Diagnostic tests 
Country 
Diagnostic tests 
                                     
BAH 
0.43 0.04 0.28 
[0.60] 
0.64 
[0.65] 
0.43 
[0.52] 
1.78 
[0.17] 
0.16 
[0.92] 
KWT 
0.55 0.02 0.11 
[0.74] 
0.12 
[0.97] 
0.02 
[0.89] 
2.05 
[0.13] 
0.84 
[0.66] 
OMN 
0.32 0.04 0.28 
[0.60] 
0.48 
[0.75] 
0.39 
[0.54] 
1.52 
[0.24] 
0.82 
[0.66] 
QTR 
0.79 0.03 0.01 
[0.92] 
0.77 
[0.56] 
0.48 
[0.50] 
0.99 
[0.43] 
1.47 
[0.48] 
SAR 
0.51 0.01 0.08 
[0.78] 
0.59 
[0.68] 
1.51 
[0.23] 
1.58 
[0.22] 
0.87 
[0.65] 
UAE 
0.66 0.02 1.33 
[0.26] 
1.11 
[0.40] 
0.03 
[0.87] 
0.38 
[0.77] 
0.47 
[0.79] 
Notes: The numbers in brackets below the diagnostic test statistics represent the 
 -values.       is the Lagrange Multiplier test for serial correlation based on   lags. 
        is for testing for heteroskedasticity.    is the Jarque-Bera test for normality.  
                  
 
  
           Table 3.3 Estimation of long-run coefficients by the DOLS procedure    
 BAH OMN SAR KUW QTR UAE 
    
 
-0.518 
(-1.13) 
1.355 
(1.94) 
0.784 
(4.34) 
-5.532 
(-2.43) 
4.717 
(5.14) 
1.533 
(2.89) 
   0.58 0.73 0.89 0.70 0.92 0.78 
 Note: Numbers in parentheses are the t-statistics.  
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Table 4 Long-run and short-run causality using ECM 
 KUW BAH SAR UAE OMN QTR 
Constant 0.114 (2.35) -0.178 (-3.26) 0.099 (3.77) -0.036 (-3.07) -0.126 (-1.74) 0.116 (2.94) 
  
 
 
 
   
 0.314 (2.24)  -0.420 (-2.65)   0.362 (2.28) 
  
 
 
 
   
  0.489 (3.61)  0.515 (5.92)   
  
  
 
 
   
  0.191 (3.35) 0.483 (2.58) -1.331 (-5.44)  -1.797 (-3.72) 
  
  
 
 
   
 2.526 (1.94) 0.290 (5.42) 0.529 (2.62) -1.619 (-2.96) 0.950 (3.69)  
       -0.534 (-4.83) -0.215 (-2.41) -0.224 (-2.12) -0.730 (-6.21) -0.166 (-1.91) -0.433 (-2.14) 
    -0.046 (-2.05)    -0.050 (-2.44) -0.079 (-12.9) 
    -0.050 (-2.15)   -0.048 (-10.4)   
     0.122 (3.97)     
    -0.055 (-2.49) -0.059 (-2.09)  -0.047 (-8.06)  -0.009 (-1.92) 
      -0.026 (-1.73)  0.123 (5.69)  
     0.088 (2.92)     
       0.037 (11.27) 0.044 (2.17)  
          
      -0.025 (-1.94)    
         -0.050 (-9.70) 
      -0.037 (-2.74)  -0.080 (-4.00)  
        0.082 (3.80) 0.124 (23.17) 
       0.036 (8.41) 0.076 (3.79)  
    -0.047 (-2.09)      
         -0.066 (-2.55) 
Diagnostic 
tests 
  
    
   0.71 0.74 0.70 0.80 0.86 0.70 
      1.098 [0.35] 0.836 [0.45] 0.119 [0.89] 1.062 [0.37] 2.215 [0.14] 0.352 [0.71] 
        0.236 [0.79] 0.595 [0.56] 0.910 [0.35] 0.208 [0.81] 0.257 [0.78] 1.504 [0.24] 
   0.535 [0.76] 0.138 [0.93] 1.113 [0.57] 0.344 [0.84] 0.529 [0.77] 0.769 [0.68] 
Note: The numbers in parentheses are the t-statistics; the p-values are in brackets.    
 
